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JETSE SPREY Cleveland State University 
Explanatory Practice in Falnily Studies 

This article makes a case for a more flexible and 
realistic explanatory practice in the family field. 
It discusses current descriptive, conceptual, and 
theoretical approaches. Furthermore, attention is 
paid to the phenomenon of explanation itself, to 
its predictive power and to the logical context of 
its questions and answers. In addition to the use 
ofselected sources from the realm offamily stud­
ies, the presentation adopts ideas from the do­
mains of the philosophy of science, mathematics, 
aiul related social sciences. 
Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, 
the evidence of things not seen. 
Hebrews 11:1 
The question "What is an explanation?" ~rarely is 
asked by family scholars. J;>~spit~,this,their coJ­
lective explanatory endeavor! ~lfemsneither hap­
hazard nor purely idiosyncra9cr;E~plru.ning som~­
thing, on the whole, tends to be ~ ~een as' different 
from trying to understand it,th~ latter offering a 
"deeper" but also a less rigorqus:t}1Ile <;If knowing. 
Our explanatory practice ref1e~t~ a pecking order 
in which theorizing outranks conceptual analysis 
and "mere" description. Usually, the last two ap­
proaches are not seen to be explanatory at all. 
Department of Sociology, Cleveland State University, Cleve­
land, OH 44115. Correspondence address: 2211 Westminster 
Road, Cleveland Heights, OH 44118. 
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A ~ few quotes from recent work by established 
family scholars may serve to illustrate the forego­
ing. First, two statements lifted from a chapter ti­
tled "Family Power" by Szinovacz (1987): "It is 
only when we attempt to explain or predict power 
that a dynamic conceptualization and careful in.; 
vestigation of 'powering' become necessary" (p. 
656) and "For a descriptive analysis of power, a 
static model of control may suffice, but an expla­
nation of power relations must reflect the com­
plexity and dynamics of ongoing 'powering' pro­
cesses" (p. 659). Explanation, in these statements, 
entails both prediction and dynamic conceptual­
ization, in contrast to a static descriptive analysis. 
A second example, from an essay on the histo­
ry of theorizing in the family field, is equally 
telling: "Theory is explanation; it answers the 
questions how, why, under what conditions. It is 
not description, myth or legend, or ideology" 
(Adams & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 75). Here, eJl:plain­
ing appears as an integral aspect of theorizing and 
is linked to specific modes of questioning. 
Contrary to the above views, I see explaining 
as a sense-making activity that, depending on its 
specific context, can be descriptive, conc~ptual, or 
theoretical. In other words, "what an explanation 
is,or can be or ought to be, depends ;n any given 
case upon its context and upon the character of the 
inquiry in which it occurs" (Gallie, 1968, p. 20). 
My stance essentially reflects an image of 
marriage and family process as one of collective 
survival and potential prospering, under complex 
and basically uncertain conditions. Explanations 
of marriage and family living-and of the institu­
tional arrangements that fashion reproduction and 
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the care of offspring in our society-thus must be 
sought at the crossroads of several scholarly 
fields. This has led to a discipline marked by a 
heterogeneity of focus, differing and, at times, 
conflicting interests, and a discourse character­
ized by dissensus as well as consensus (Sprey, 
1990). This, in tum, suggests an explanatory en­
terprise that allows for the management-not nec­
essarily the resolution-of the intellectual and , 
ideological disputes that are likely to continue as':­
an integral aspect of family studies. 
This essay is about explaining as a process and 
as the outcomes of that process. It is not meant to 
be a purely theoretical effort, nor does it aim to 
present specific recipes for the explanation of 
phenomena and events. I intend to make a case 
rather-than to prove one. In line with this, myar­
gument is fashioned by "following the common 
scientific practice of the ,persuasive use of cita­
tions" (Kellert, 1993, p. xii). After a brief treat­
ment· of explanation per se--especially the logic 
of its questioning and its predictive power-de­
scription, conceptualization, and theorizing are 
dealt with in tum as explanatory strategies in the 
family field. 
ON EXPLANATION 
An explanation is a statement designed to make 
sense of something that, so far, remains poorly 
understood ~d inadequately accounted for. It is 
the answer to a question and, in that capacity, 
must accomplish two things. First, the curiosity of 
those asking the question should be satisfied. Sec­
ondly, especially in scholarly domains of inquiry, 
the explanation 'should provide credible and rele­
vant information .. 
Pragmatically speaking, one could argue that 
an explanation has served its purpose 'when the 
curiosity of its questioners is satisfied. Decades 
ago the physicist P. W. Bridgman (1928) wrote 
that "examination will show that the essence of an 
explanation consists in reducing a situation to ele­
ments with which we are so familiar that we ac­
cept them as a matter of course, so that our cu­
riosity rests" (p. 37). Some contemporary scholars 
reject this view as too simplistic (cf. Salmon, 
1984), and their point is well taken. Bridgman's 
comment, however, touches on an intrinsic aspect 
of all explaining, namely its relativity. In his im­
portant book The Scientific Image, the philoso­
pher Van Fraassen (1980) put it this way: 
Being an explanation is essentially relative, for 
an explanation is an answer. (In just that sense, 
being a daughter is something relative: Every 
woman is a daughter, and every daughter is a 
woman, yet ~ing a daughter is not the same as 
being a woman.) Since an explanation is an an­
swer, it is evaluated vis-a-vis a question, which 
is a request for information. But exactly what is 
requested ... differs from context to context. (p. 
156) 
In other words, our explanations to chil~n differ 

. from those to adults, those to the ignorant differ 

from those to the experts, and those to strangers 

differ from those to friends. 
Of course, the "ignorant" and children are un­
likely consumers of the explanatory contributions 
of family scholars, whose audience consists of 
their professional colleagues, clinicians, informed 
policy makers, and a relatively select segment of 
those who exist in marriages and families. One 
must ask, therefore, how separate is this audience 
from the one studied by scholars, guided by clini­
cians, and manipulated by policy makers? In this 
essay the line between. what family scholars do 
and what their "sllbjects" do is a dotted one. In 
fact, a good number of the quotations offered in 
this article echo the explanatory practices of those 
who live the realities of our subject matter's 
world. It is here, I believe, that a reflection on the 
s~te of explanatory practice in the family field 
differs fundamentally from that in either physics 
or biology. 
What further complicates attempts to under­
stand the nature of explaining in all scholarly dis­
ciplines is the fact that explanations serve not 
merely as answers but a:lso as assertions. They 
present claims one wants to have accepted as 
valid, relevant, and of importance to the state of 
knowledge in and, perhaps, beyond one's field. 
One desires more than just to satisfy one's own 
curiosity, and this requires a set ofshared conven­
tions, an established "methodology," and a cul­
ture in which such standards are recognized and 
sanctioned. 
The Status Quo 
Earlier cited perceptions of explanation in our 
field illustrate, perhaps unwittingly, that a con­
ventional frame of reference may lose its hold un­
evenly, more thoroughly at one point than anoth­
er. As a discipline, our own past seems firmly 
rooted in the seminal contributions of Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1988), to whom explaining 
meant the sUbsumption of what must be account­
ed for, the explanandum, under a set of laws or a 
theory. For Hempel and Oppenheim, the univer­
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sality o.f such laws was seen to. be "indispensable" 
(p. 23). They wrote that theories, as explanato.ry 
systems, 
have the functiQn Qf establishing syste~tic CQn­
nectiQns amQng the data Qf Qur experience, so. as 
to. make possible the derivation Qf SQme QfthQse 
data from Qthers. AccQrding as, at the time Qf the 
derivation, the derived data are, or are nQt yet, 
knQwn to. have Qccurred, the derivatiQn is re­
ferred to. as explanatiQn Qr predictiQn. (Hempel 
. & Oppenheim, 1988, p. 32) 
Explanatio.n, then, appears to. be the ultimate aim 
o.f theo.rizing and an integral 'Part o.f its process. In 
such a scheme of things predictio.n and explana­
tio.n represent two. sides o.f o.ne co.in. The fo.rmer 
tells the future, the latter aCCo.unts fo.r the present 
and the past. In this "mechanistic" Newto.nian 
framewo.rk, time serves as the fo.urth dimensio.n 
o.f space and, as such, strengthens allusio.ns to. 
causality. It no. lo.nger flies like an arro.w and its 
irreversibility is go.ne, a point to be taken up again 
later in this essay. 
From its inceptio.n Carl Hempel's "no.mo.lo.gi­
cal" model has been challenged and amended by 
philo.so.phers (Salmo.n, 1984; Van Fraassen, 
1980) .. So.cial scientists, especially cultural an­
thro.polo.gists, ihcreasingly emphasize "ideo.graph­
ic" o.r case o.riented explanatio.ns (cf. Geertz, 
1983; Ro.saldo., 1993) as a suitable, mo.re realistic 
alternative. Yet, so.me o.fthe no.mo.lo.gical model's 
basic tenets co.ntinue to.teverberate in the family 
do.main, even amo.ng tho.se who. aremo.ving to.­
ward a "Po.stpositivist" appro.ach (Tho.mas & 
Wilco.x, 1987). Furthermo.re, the family field it­
self has changed o.ver the past decades, intellectu­
ally and ideo.lo.gically (Sprey, 1988). It may be 
time, therefo.re, to. co.nfront the tensio.ns that re­
main :within the confines o.f the field's explanato.­
ry practice. ' j 
My rejectio.n o.f an exclusive linkage between 
explanatio.n and theorizing will surface repeatedly 
througho.ut the fo.llo.wing discussio.ns. I do. indeed 
reco.gnize theo.ry as the prime explanato.ry vehicle 
in family studies, but I do. no.t see it necessarily as 
its mo.st valuable and/o.r desirable co.ntributio.n to. 
practitio.ners o.r to. tho.se who. struggle to. survive 
in current marriages and families. Others also. 
have made this point, and Scanzoni and Marsiglio 
(1993) seemed to. extend it to. allscho.larly ex­
planato.ry effo.rts when they ·o.bserved that ~'al­
tho.ugh mo.st o.f to.day's researchers are ho.peful 
that their wo.rk will have so.me practical benefit, it 
is o.ften unclear whether they are asking the kind 
o.f research questio.ns that will help supply the 
mo.st practical answers" (p. 107). 
The French so.cio.lo.gist Pierre Bo.urdieu (1977) 
co.ntended that peo.ple who. live in marriages and 
families functio.n first and fo.remo.st as strategists 
rather than as ho.mespun theo.reticians. To. survive 
and prosper, they rely o.n time-tested pragmatic 
so.lutio.ns rather than theo.ries. In a similar' vein a 
co.ntempo.rary ethno.grapher wrote: 
In everyday life the wise guide themselves as 
Qften by waiting to. see hQW events unfold as by 
plans and predictions. When in dQubt, people 
find Qut about their worlds by living with ambi­
guity, uncertainty, Qr simple lack Qf knQwledge 
until the day, if and when it arrives, that their 
life experiences clarify matters .... We Qften 
improvise, learn by dQing, and make things up 
as we go. alQng. (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 92) 
This is no.t to. suggest that scho.larly explana­
tio.ns and practice are inco.mpatible-far from it. 
It is a reminder, ho.wever, that, ultimately, all o.ur 
explanatio.ns are abo.ut practice. It seems illusio.n­
ary, therefo.re, to. co.nsider o.ne's explanato.ry prac­
tice-theo.retical o.r o.therwise-as to.tally separate 
fro.m the explanato.ry practice o.f those o.ne stud­
ies. What matters, then, is no.t the do.tted line be­
tween the practice o.f tho.se who. ask the questio.ns 
and that o.f tho.se to. be surveyed, but rather the 
scho.lar's preconceptio.ns about any fo.rm o.f co.n­
tempo.rary human existence .. In his remarkable 
bo.o.k, Postmodern Ethics, Zygmunt Bauman 
(1993) labeled postmodernity as "mo.dernity with­
o.ut illusio.ns" and suggested that such illusio.ns 
"bo.il do.wn to. the belief that the 'messiness' o.f 
the human world is but a tempo.rary and re­
pairable state, so.o.ner o.r later to. be replaced by 
the o.rderly and systematic rule o.f reaso.n" (p. 32). 
Po.stmo.dernity includes an awareness that "the 
'messiness' will stay whatever we do. o.r kno.w, 
that the little o.rders and 'systems' we carve o.ut in 
the wo.rld are brittle, until further no.tice,and as 
arbitrary and in the end co.ntingent as their alter­
natives" (p. 34). One do.es no.lhave to. share Bau­
man:$ image o.f co.ntempo.rary so.cial reality to. 
reco.gnize that it expo.ses as an illusio.n the co.n­
ventio.nal dicho.to.my between the scho.larly o.b­
server and his o.r her human subjects. 
On Prediction 
Predictio.n rarely occurs fo.r its o.wn sake but,usu­
ally happens fo.r a variety o.f reaso.ns.Many re­
flect underlying assumptio.ns. This is well illus­
trated in the fo.llo.wing co.mment by the edito.r o.f a 
multidisciplinary bo.o.k, Predicting the Future: . 
870 
A notion as fundamental as prediction does not 
exist in a vacuum. It is attached to a variety of 
other concepts which are linked in a ,systematic 
way and constitute part of the very fabric of 
thought of the society in question. What we mean 
by prediction is grounded therefore in a set of 
cultural assumptions about the relationship of the 
present to the past as well as to the future,about 
what we take to be knowledge about the world 
and how we arrive at it. (Howe, 1993, p. 4) 
The conventional linkage between the worth of an 
explanatory statement and its predictive power, 
for ex.ample, reflects cultural assumptions as 
much as it does rational thought. In our culture, 
knowledge implies power (cf. Elias, 1984; Fou­
cault, 1980) so that prediction allows for control 
of the present and the foreseeable future. 
Howe's statement also takes us back to the role 
of time in our explanatory efforts. As a fourth di­
mension of Newtonian space, the dynamics of 
time can and traditionally have been dealt with in 
tlie framework of four-dimensional geometry. This may be useful in some physical sCiences but 
far less so in the biological and the social sciences. 
In the words of a prominent mathematician: 
Today. general relativity is the direct heir of 
Newtonian cosmology. The geometrical proper­
ties of Einstein's four-dimensional space-time 
translate into laws of motion.... From Newton 
to Einstein the mathematics has beCome infinite­
ly more complicated. 'Butthe outlook is the 
same: Time is absorbed into space; the laws of 
motion become 'problems in geometry. Theuni­
verse is closed upon itself, regulated by strict de­
terminism. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 109) 
Ekeland observed that recent work in advanced 
mathematics shows time to be both unpredictable 
and "innovative" and, as a concept, far closer to 
the real world than it had appeared to be in New­
ton's or Einstein's scheme of things: 
A simpie mathematicalmodel,the baker's trans­

, formation, has helped us understand how this 

notion of time can arise in a purely deterininistic 

world.... In this kind of situation the challenge 

,to scientists is very much like that of giving an 
accurate picture of a stream, with its ever-chang­
ing flow, its currents and eddies. (Ekeland, 1990, 
p.110) 
In that sense, predicting means singling out con­
figurations of events that mayor are likely to hap­
pen in the future. Time, thought of in this way, 
enters' into the "stream" and becomes part of its 
flow rather than remaining ofilya dimension of its 
external environment. It becomes "a successIon 
of fleeting states, largely independent of each 
other. The traces of the past disappear very quick­
ly, and each instant of time brings something 
new" (Ekeland, 1990, p. 111). 
What, if anything. does the above have to do 
with the ways in which family scholars ex.plain 
phenomena and events? Perhaps a great deal, de­
pending on the degree to which one is willing to 
challenge the premises that underpin one's ap­
proach. The reliance on longitudinal research. for 
example. rests on the premise'that the flow of 
time is continuous and that the past does not dis­
appear but is causally linked to the present and 
the future. The theoretical PQssibility that, over 
time, systems may lose their "memory" or be­
come effectively separated from it, rarely seems 
to occur to family scholars. Cross-national com­
parative research often ,rests on the premise that 
an hour'sor a day's time is the same all over the 
world. However. the idea that "fleeting states" of 
time could be independent of one another poses a 
major challenge to that assumption. 
The fact that 10 years in our past equals 10 
years in the future is mathematically correct, but 
in terms of real time perhaps somewhat mislead­
ing. The idea that an 80-year-old person is twice 
as old as a 40-year-old also ~eems somewhat un­
realistic. Would the average 80-year-old really 
see himself or herself as halfway to 160? By the 
same token, reaching middle age may mean to 
some the end, to others a new beginning. Does all 
this mean, then, that predictability-as a stan­
dard-should be eliminated in the evaluation of 
explanatory worth? Not necessarily. After all, not 
much of it exists in family studies to begin with. I 
see predictability asa desirable. risky, and thus 
limited potential, one that to :be worthwhile re­
quires, among other things, a good deal of atten­
tion to the context of what is to be foretold and an 
awareness of what can and cannot be known 
under any given set of circumstances. 
It seems to me that family scholars could ben­
efit from modeling their predictive strategies after 
those of a field like meteorology, This would 
mean a focus on the "stream" rather than on just 
the things that float along in it It would locate re­
lational or process-oriented concepts, such' as 
"asymmetry" and "turbulence," centrally in one's 
conceptual scheme. In that manner, it might be 
easier to grasp the systemic nature of phenomena 
like violence-prone bonds. fragile networks, or il­
legitimacy-prone families. On this level of analy­
sis it is not possible to identify which marriages 
will dissolve or become violent, but this is some­
thing many researchers do not wish to predict in 
the first place. 
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The above ideas are far from new. Henri 
Poincare (195211908), the intellectual ancestor of 
the mathematics of nonlinear systems or chaos 
theory, wrote in 1908: 
Why is it that showers and even storms seem to 
come by chance, so that many people think it 
quite natural to pray for rain or fine weather? ... 
We see that great disturbances are generally pro­
duced in regions where the atmosphere is in un­
stable equilibrium. The meteorologists see very 
well that the equilibrium is unstable, that a cy­
clone will be formed somewhere, but exactly 
where they are not in a position to say: a tenth of 
a degree more or less at any given point, and the 
cyclone will burst here and not there .... If they 
had been aware of this tenth of a degree, they 
could have known it beforehand, but the obser­
vations were neither sufficiently comprehensive 
nor sufficiently precise, and that is the reason 
why it all seems due to the intervention of 
chance. (pp. 68-69) 
Despite the impressive work of a growing number 
of contemporary family scholars, especially on 
the macro-level of analysis, the dynamics of mari­
tal and family processes continue to dude all but 
explanations of a statistical and, therefore, corre­
lational nature. In such explanatioris, informative 
as they may be, "chance" continues to playa sig­
nificant and, perhaps, undeserved part. 
Questions and Answers 
In a previous section Adams and Steinmetz 
(1993) were cited as defining anexplanationas 
providing answers to the questi9*:"liow,~' "why/' 
and "under what conditions.!' iTaking my cue 
from erotetic logic (Bromberget, 'll992), I suggest, 
however, that all English-langtiagd questions ini­
tiated with "What," "how," "When," "where~" 
"which," and "who"differ fundamentally from 
sentences beginning with "why;" The ones in the 
first set reflect, each in its own:way, different 
~ . II 1'1 ' premises underlying the exact 9at1JIe of their an­
swers than is ,the case for "whr" questions. The 
latter, in contrast to all others, requires "because" 
answers. "What is this?" thus differs fundamen­
tally from "Why is this the case?" 
In this essay, interrogative !sentences begin­
ning with "what" or "how" ar~' labeled as either 
descriptive or conceptual; "under what condi­
tions" simply represents another way of asking 
"how." "Why" questions are seen as theoretical. 
All categories of questions are potentially ex­
planatory, but a caveat is in order. In everyday 
discourse many' answers are not expected to ex­
plain anything at all. A request for the correct 
time does not demand any explanation. The dis­
'tinction made here is an analytical one and is de­
signed to clearly separate different lines of ques­
tioning. 
Erotetic logic deals with the relationships be­
tween questions and answers. Much of its content 
appears'too technical to be of direct use to stu­
dents of the family. Heuristically, however, its 
premises and some of its observations should be 
of interest to anyone involved in the appraisal of 
our current explanatory practice. 
Let me touch briefly on some pertinent ideas. 
First, as expressed by Bromberger(l992): 
Every question stands in three different relations 
to specifiable propositions. Some propositions 
give rise to it; some propositions are presupposed 
by it; some propositions are direct answers to it. 
For instance, "The Empire State Building is 
heavy" gives rise to "How heavy ... ?" ''There is 
a King of France" is presupposed by "What is the 
age of the present King of France?" and "The 
present King ... weighs 500 pounds" is a direct 
answer to "What is the weight of the present 
King of France?" (p. 120) 
'A proposition gives rise to a question if it impos­
es the condition that a correct answer to it does 
exist; it is a presupposition for a question if its 
falsehood means that the question has no correct 
, answer. Ask a foolish question and you get a fool­
ish answer (Belknap & Steel, 1976). 
The notion of a direct answer is a central tenet 
in erotetic logic. As a response it may be either 
true or'ialse"but it must "completely, but just 
cornpl~t~IY"ipnswer the question (Belknap & 
Steyl" 1',9;76, p~ 3). And, finaliy,as Belknap and 
Steel (1996) ekplained: : I' ',' "~I 
,	hb ~b~rii~k of a question addres!Sed~ a q~ery 
syste.ri isn(jt 'to be. identified with bow the' sys­
tem prPc~ss~s the query ... but iather1jt is to be 
iclenclfied':with a range of answetrthat'the ques­
don ~1'Illit~; That is, for a query system and a 
tiser to! agte~ 6n the meaning of ~. question is for 
there to b6 an 'agreement as to what counts as an 
answer to the question, regardless of how, or if, 
any answer is produced. (p. 2) 
If I ask, "Which ,hat did you wear last night, the 
blue one or the red one?", I presume that my re­
spondent did wear a hat and that it was either red 
or blue. The statement "not the red one" may be 
true but does not answer my question. Other 
nonanswerS are: "I did not wear a hat," "not the 
blue one," or "I wore a baseball cap:' If the pre­
conditions for a question are not properly met in 
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the format of its statement, it becomes spurious 
because it allows for irrelevant responses. 
The presuppositions that underpin "what" and 
"how" questions differ from those of "why" ques­
tions because their descriptive attributes are fi­
nite. A "what" question is "canceled when one of 
its direct answers is confirmed. It is tentatively 
canceled when one of its direct answers is shown 
to be probable or warranted" (Bromberger, 1992, 
p. 121). The same holds for "how" questions. 
"Why" questions call for answers that, in turn, 
may allow for additional questioning. Their "be­
cause" responses invoke the presence of forces 
such as fate, empirical causality, or the ,power of 
the supernatural. A question like "What happened 
hereT can be answered descriptively and conclu­
sively, but "Why did this happen?" allows, in 
principle. for a seemingly endless chain of further 
questions. 
With this in mind, it is instructive to consider 
the current state of questioning in family studies. 
How, for example, does one rate questions that 
are raised simply because, so far, no one has 
asked them? What about the questioning that 
guides so-called exploratory research? Does it 
produce "exploratory" answers? And how do we 
evaluate the questioning that underpins our ever­
growing data banks? Is it important because of 
the descriptive quality of its responses? Or is 
there more to it? 
DESCRIPTION 
In family studies, as in all the human sciences, the 
term description stands for the generation of spe­
cific inventories. When one describes, one aims 
to compile reliable empirical accounts or, as 
Webster's dictionary has it, "lifelike images" of 
specific things or events. The usefulness of such 
stock taking lies in its presumed degree of preci­
sion and reliability. It generally is assumed that 
sound descriptive information may serve as a first 
step toward further conceptual and/or theoretical 
reasoning. However, these data alone are not con­
sidered explanatory. 
Focused Description 
The foregoing may hold for ordinary instrumental 
stock taking, but it paints an inadequate picture pf 
,the role of description in family studies, There, 
descriptive work tends to be focused and de­
signed to answer specific "what" or: ''how'' ques­
tions. The latter are guided by preconceptions 
about what is to be described. 
The sense making of any specific descriptive 
piece of work depends on its focus. For example, 
how well does it allow ''noise'' to be separated 
from relevant information? How far do its data 
reach into the future? To give a mundane exam­
ple, a telephone directory provides reliable infor­
mation and a degree of predictive power but does 
not offer valid grounds for conceptual, let alone 
theoretical, reasoning. 
Reliable, descriptive data tend to be seen as 
objective and, as such, true representations of re­
ality. This is an illusion because objective mea­
sures are not intrinsic to the real world. The 
human-made criteria designed to evaluate desig­
nated facts remain in essence arbitrary. To clarify 
this basic point, assume that we have access to 
three clearly recognizable images of a given per­
son, namely a photograph, a painted portrait, and 
a penciled caricature. It makes no sense, then, to 
ask which one of these best represents the real 
person. Instead, we choose the one that serves our 
interest and matches our preconception of what 
the individual in question "really" is like. As an 
attribute of description, objectivity at best is a 
working hypothesis-at worst, a potentially mis­
leading misconception. 
Because focused description answers "what" 
or "how" questions, its explanatory worth de­
pends as much on the quality of its questioning as 
on the ways in which the responses are obtained. 
A foolish question begets a foolish answer, re­
gardless of whether it is asked during an in-depth 
interview or as part of a mailed questionnaire. 
This may be overlooked when issues of logic are 
ignored during disputes about the pros and cons 
of different data-gathering strategies. Consider, 
for example, the following quote from an other­
wise excellent treatise ,on the art of mterviewing: 
Even though fixed-question-open-response inter­
viewing may at first appear to be a systematic 
approach to qualitative interviewing, it is not. It 
is a different approach entirely. While studies 
using this approach may avoid some of the vul­
nerabilities of qualitative interviewing studies, 
they also lack their strengths. (Weiss, 1994, 
p.14) 
The voice of logic, seems muted throughout this 
statement. One might ask, for example, what ex­
actly is the strength of "qualitative interviewing"? 
Is its power superior ip the discovery of the truth? 
If so, which one? The pho!ograph? The painted 
portrait?Or perhaps the caricature? I assume that 
scholars who opt for the use of interviews know 
what they are looking for. But I wonder if they re­
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alize that even the most carefully framed "what" 
or "how" questions are unlikely to produce valid 
"because" answers. 
To place the above issue in a broader perspec­
tive, let me return to mathematics-the most ''un­
real" of all sciences. In a discussion of Henri 
Poincare's contributions to that field one reads: 
As a general rule, Poincare, who is without peer 
where computing is concerned, pushes his calcu­
lations as far as they will go. When the limit is 
reached, he first surveys the road he has covered 
thus far, and then he tries to peer ahead into the 
mist. ... At this frontier of knowledge, one must 
change instruments. For quantitative methods, 
accurate but limited in scope, we must substitute 
qualitative methods, which have greater range 
but less precision. Poincare was the undisputed 
master of qualitative methods, which he intro­
duced under the name of analysis situs-nowa­
days topology. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 35) 
Poincare was one of the first scholars to stress the 
limitations of Newton's mecanique celeste and to 
challenge its deterministic underpinnings, thus 
opening the door to the study of nonlinear sys­
tems or so-called chaos theory. 
The choice between a quantitative and a quali­
tative approach thus involves more than a consid­
eration of the merits of different strategies of data 
gathering and analysis. Nor can it be equated with 
a choice between postpositivist and hermeneutic 
approaches. Rather, it represents .a choice be­
tween two methodologies in the broadest sense of 
that term. One of these is, by design, quite accu­
rate but limited in the scope of its "why" ques­
tioning. The other aims for greater depth but al­
lows for less precision. 
At this stage in the discussion, however, it be­
comes necessary to consider the potential move 
of focused description toward the level of theoret­
ical explanation. When this happens, "what" 
questions make room for "how" questions. In and 
of themselves, the latter are descriptive, explain­
ing how something works but not telling us why 
such is the case. "How" questioning, however, 
may foreshadow theoretical reasoning and, in that 
. capacity, link focused-often conceptualized­
descriptive work to theoretical questioning. 
Not surprisingly, the boundaries between de­
scriptive and other explanatory pathways remain 
disputed. In ethnography, a discipline overlapping 
family studies, theoretical thinking is discussed as 
a possible legitimate aspect of field research. For 
example, Marcus and Fisher (1986) wrote the fol­
lowing: 
Within anthropology, ethnographic fieldwork 
and writing have become the most lively current 
arenas of theoretical discussion and innovation. 
Ethnography's concern is with description, and 
present efforts to make ethnographic writing 
more sensitive to its broader political, historical, 
and philosophical implications place anthropolo­
gy at the vortex of the debate about the problem 
of representing society in contemporary dis­
courses. (p. vii) 
Others, however, !ie.e competent descriptive work, 
because of its line of questioning, as essentially 
atheoretical (Atkinson, 1990; Hammersley, 
1992). I share that view but, as stated earlier, at 
the same time consider theorizing as only one 
quite special approach among the spectrum of ex­
planatory strategies. 
At the present time, much published research 
in family studies appears basically descriptive: Its 
questioning is not designed to reach beyond the 
"what" or "how ... ·Such work increasingly utilizes 
large data sets and sophisticated statistical proce­
dures. Its products seem analogous to maps in 
that they chart. unexplored territories and/or up­
date existing inventories. They help identify 
available routes, but do not tell us where to go. 
Reliable, up-to-date "maps" of the distribution 
and course of processes such as marital dissolu­
tion, domestic violence, dual career marriages, 
and mate selection are crucial in ongoing attempts 
to diagnose the state of and the changes in the re­
alities of contemporary marriage and family liv­
ing: Given the insights and skills of the scholars 
involved, they also provide the foundation for 
deeper questioning. 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
A concept isa definition with a purpose. It usual­
ly is created to serve with others of its kind as 
part of a ·coherent analytic vocabulary, one that 
will allow for explanatory thinking. Such concep­
tual frameworks can be seen as "ways of organiz­
ing experience; they are systems of categories 
that give form to the data of sensation; they are 
points of view from which individuals, cultures, 
or periods survey the passing scene" (Davidson, 
1984, p. 183). Apart from providing a necessary 
condition for theoretical reasoning, such schemes 
organize our knowledge and may make a kind of 
. sense that reaches deeper and beyond the sense 
making offered by descriptive maps; In that role, 
concepts guide but also set a limit to one's poten­
tial to observe. One may think about strain, for 
example, as either mental or physical. This does 
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not mean that the two are similar but, rather, that 
both can be understood as variations on a com­
mon theme. John Gottman's (1994) "cascade" 
model of the divorce process also offers a good il­
lustration. It is a concept born as a metaphor and 
then recruited to describe the. course of a marriage 
on its way to dissolution. 
The foregoing illustrates the explanatory 
power of conceptual reasoning. Concepts by 
themselves are not theories, and their explanatory 
potential differs from that of theories. By the 
same token, concepts may well become an inte­
gral part of theorizing because they provide the 
vocabulary by means of which "why" questions 
are formulated. 
As a process, conceptualization may evolve 
from description, but a focused descriptive study 
also may have been conceptually infonned from 
its outset. In other words, reasoning descriptively 
and conceptually seems likely to follow a path of 
reciprocity rather than one of strict linearity. It is 
quite possible, though, to halt an explanatory 
march at the conceptual stage. The mere placing 
of seemingly isolated events in a broader context 
may be sufficient to meet the needs of given prac­
titioners or of family members trying to make 
sense of their joint lives. On the frontiers of mari­
tal and familial existence, such direct answers 
maybe enough to help manage problems or solve 
contingencies. So why go on asking? 
Eventually, however, isolated concepts, illu­
minating as they may be, are likely to be linked to 
others in more or less coherent analytic vocabu­
laries. The concept of minority, for example, 
tends to be linked with that of power, ethnicity 
calls forth culture, and so forth. In the history of 
family studies, Hill-and Hansen (1960) were the 
first to recognize the value of such conceptual 
frameworks. Their stated aim was not theoretical 
per se but, rather, to take a "step that raises the in­
ventory beyond simple accumulation toward real 
significance" (p. 299). That, I suggest, is what 
conceptualization is all about. 
THEORETICAL ExPLANATION 
In contrast to the preceding two approaches, theo­
ries are expected to answer ''why'' questions, but 
many myths and legends also answer these. ques­
tions. Unique standards have been formulated 
over the years to distinguish theoretical accounts 
from folklore, legends, and explanations anchored 
in the supernatural. These criteria, however, re­
main arbitrary and open to revision. What theory, 
myth, and the supernatural do share is their ulti­
mate dependence. on faith, on "the evidence of 
things not seen" (Hebrews 11: 1). 
Much published work in our field qualifies as 
theoretical only in a broad sense of the word. 
After reviewing the 19 theory-focused contribu­
tions to the Sourcebook of Family Theories and 
Methods (Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, & 
Steinmetz, 1993), I noted that "a telling reminder 
of the state of our theoretical enterprise is that 
theorizing, conceptualization, and even descrip­
tion continue ... to mean different things todif­
ferent scholars in our field" (Sprey, Atkinson, & 
Fine, 1993, p. 512). Even theory-oriented papers 
do not always invoke underlying theoretical as­
sumptions. Their arguments often follow what 
one prominent scientist (Hoyle, 1994, p. 106) 
called a "look-see" method. To find out if mili­
tary combat experience affects the marital careers 
of veterans, for example, the obvious strategy is 
to gain access to or create a suitable data set and 
then find out what the facts are (Gimbel & Booth, 
1994). This approach also allows one to investi­
gate how marital quality, divorce, and remarriage 
affect the exchange of help between parents and 
offspring (Amato, Rezac & Booth, 1995), to see 
how the rising proportion of unmarried adults im­
pacts on the balance of parent-child exchanges 
(White & Peterson, 1995), and so forth. 
Such explanatory strategies do not necessarily 
exclude the use of theory. In fact, one may find 
certain theoretical considerations cited as the ratio­
nale for testable hypotheses or for models to be fit­
ted to the real world. In carrying out the research, 
some of these theoretical concerns are accepted 
and others rejected. Those that are rejected do not 
always feature in the conClusions of such inductive 
research. They may be discarded and achieve the 
status of wrong guesses. This is not surprising be­
cause answers to ''what'' and "how" questions are 
not directly suited to explain why specific working 
hypotheses tum out to be incorrect. 
So one might ask, when can explanatory state­
ments be seen as theoretical? In the context of 
this essay I would suggest that asking one or 
more valid "why" questions would be sufficient. 
But, given the state of knowledge in our field, 
would it also be necessary? To this question I 
have no ready response. My inclination is to an­
swer that it depends on the degree to which the 
"hows" in the explanation not merely allow but 
actually inspire subsequent "why" questioning. 
Two brief references to recently published, high­
quality research may serve to Clarify this admit­
tedly disputable point of view. 
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In a thorough study of urban-rural differences 
between patterns of aid giving, Amato (1993) 
borrowed from social disorganization theory, 
overload theory, and subculture theory in order to 
lay the foundations for his questioning. Each of 
these "mini-theories," however, provided only a 
limited conceptual vocabulary, so that all three re­
mained precariously integrated into the logical 
structure of the study's analysis. The formal ties 
among the three also were left relatively unex­
plored. In his final summation, the author report­
ed, among other results, that urbanites are some­
what more likely to exchange help with friends 
than people Who live in rural settings and suggest­
ed that such "associations appear to exist because 
the settings have different demographic mixes 
and because urbanites move more often and live 
farther from relatives" (p. 261). This sounds rea­
sonable, but seems not directly relevant to any 
one of the earlier cited theories. The conclusions, 
then, derive their explanatory worth from their 
contribution to our empirical knowledge about 
how friendship ties appear to operate under pres­
ent-day urban and rural conditions. 
A second example, taken from a good study of 
the linkages between women's occupational and 
caregiving roles (Moen, Robison, & Fields, 
1994), also provides insight into the dynamics of 
explanation. The authors of this study wanted to 
discover if "prolonged caregiving spells preclude 
women's on-going involvement in a paid job in 
the same way that caring for preschoolers has" 
and if "adult caregiving demands hinder women's 
entry or re-entry into the labor force" (p. SI76). 
They discovered, among other things, that "more 
recent cohorts of American women are more like­
ly than those born earlier in the century to take on 
the caregiving role, despite their increased in­
volvement in the paid labor force and the societal 
revolution in gender expectations" (p. SI84). 
This finding caused the authors to wonder why 
caregiving for ailing relatives is still considered to 
be the province of women (p. SI67). Because 
their study design was informed by a major con­
ceptual frame of reference-that of the life 
course-such a move toward "why" questioning 
seems warranted. To respond to this question, 
however, will require a theoretical perspective in 
which the dynamics of sociocultural change are 
of central concern. This means, for instance, ask­
ing why sociocultural change, such as that in the 
prescription of gender roles, may appear inconsis­
tent and even haphazard. 
This, in tum, implies a challenge to some or 
all of the givens that still underpin much theoreti­
cal thinking in our field. To illustrate this point, 
consider a comment by an established ethnogra­
pher (Rosaldo, 1993). It addresses a similar issue: 
In my view, this gap separating description and 
conclusion derives from an unresolved tension 
about whether to describe cultures as loosely 
tied bundles of informal practices, or as well­
formed systems regulated by control mecha­
nisms, or as the interplay of both. (p. 94) 
To move from how to why in order to make theo­
retical sense of seemingly "unruly" findings in­
volves more than a choice between conceptual 
schemes or even mini-theories. It means coming 
to grips with the preconceptions that underlie and 
fashion the ways in which we begin to imagine 
what it is we wish to explain. 
The following two brief quotations from re­
cently published work in the natural sciences 
should make this clear: 
The evolution of a chaotic system is sensitive to 
the precise specification of the initial state; this 
means that irrespective of how complex our 
models become, or how accurate our weather 
data are, the laws of science impose a limit be­
yond which prediction of the weather is impossi­
ble. (Palmer, 1992, p. 71) 
Biological systems, from communities and pop­
ulations to physiological processes, are governed 
by nonlinear mechanisms. This means that we 
must expect to see chaos asoften as we see cy­
cles or steadiness.. ".. We would all be better off 
if more people realized that simple nonlinear 
systems do not necessarily possess simple dy­
namical properties. (May, 1992, p. 95) 
If we conceive of marital and family processes as 
essentially "nonlinear," we must accept that under 
certain conditions their cultural interiors indeed 
may best bethought of as "loosely tied bundles of 
informal practices" (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 94). Judith 
Stacey's (1990) book Brave New Families, for 
example, seems to bear this out. And so does 
Oscar Lewis' (1966) seminal, much older, study 
of Puerto Rican families in the "culture of pover­
ty." In the lives of such families, conflict and 
peace, order and disorder, coexist. The families' 
niere continuation-sometimes misinterpreted as 
stability-resembles currents in a river that, de­
spite repeated episodes of flooding and extreme 
turbulence, still manages to find its way. 
Returning for a moment to Moen et aI.' s study 
"(1994), there is no theoretical rationale to assume 
that the continuing changes in and between gen­
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der roles will follow a linear path. Changes reflect 
a process of "orderly chaos," that is, one quite 
sensitive to initial states, not necessarily continu­
ous, and thus basically unpredictable. 
On the institutional level, a view of process as 
chaotic may, among other things, help us to see 
changes in divorce, marriage, and illegitimacy 
rates as indications of sociocultural "turbulence" 
and, therefore, as ultimately system maintaining 
instead of destructive. Changes in these rates may 
signal a societal process in which institutionalized 
forms of human sociability compete for a chance 
to evolve, dominate, or simply survive. Andrew 
Cherlin's (1992) careful study of the past and cur­
rent course of marriage, divorce, and remarriage 
may help illustrate this. 
, In his chapter on explanations, Cherlin noted 
that no one foresaw the postwar baby boom, and 
that, of the explanations of the ups and downs in 
postwar divorce rates, "most can be classified as 
either 'period' or 'cohort' ones" (p. 31). This may 
be of interest to demographers but to me it indi­
cates that such accounts, on the whole, amount to 
little more than well-reasoned post facto interpre­
tations. Cherlin himself improved on such efforts 
by framing the course of the postwar decades as 
"one long-term historical process" and "two spe­
cific historical events" (p. 62). He then explained 
the former as one in which "society-wide changes 
in women's worklives and reproductive lives 
have promoted the acceleration of .the long-term 
rise in divorce and the long-term fall in fertility 
that has characterized the United States since the 
mid-nineteenth century" (p. 63). The Great De­
pression and World War II are singled out as the 
events that interfered with the normal course of 
long-term historical development. Cherlin's ex­
planation is not theoretical in a neo-positivist 
sense which, in my view, does not make it less 
explanatory or "sense making." It does not tell us 
much about the future course of events. There is 
no reason to assume, for example,that the next 
"great depression" will affect the institutions of 
marriage and family in ways that resemble what 
happened in the past. One of the main theoretical 
contributions of family demography seems to be 
that its findings effectively undermine our faith in 
the presence of linear causality throughout the 
course of any long-range sociocultural process. 
IN CONCLUSION 
In his autobiography, the astronomer and Nobel 
Prize recipient Fred Hoyle (1994) remarked that 
an idea "leads nowhere unless it can be followed 
up either by an experiment or by a precise calcu­
lation" (p. 230). In principle, I agree with him. In 
our field, we 'do have ideas but very few mathe­
matical trajectories and, except on the micro­
level, no real experimentation to speak of. So 
where does this leave our explanatory practice? 
Where it always has been, in our own hands. 
With this in mind I offer some final comments 
and close my case. 
A crucial problem of explanatory practice in a 
realm as diverse as ours is for it to achieve both 
credibility and relevance. To address this, i will 
again refer to Van Fraassen's book (1980). In a 
chapter on the pragmatics of explanation, he 
wrote: 
If you ask a scientist to explain something to 
you, the information he gives you is not different 
in kind , . , from the information he gives you 
when you ask for a description, . " , To call an 
explanation scientific is to say nothing about its 
form or the, sort of information adduced, but, 
only that the explanation draws on science to get 
this information (at least to some extent). (pp. 
155-156) 
This comment illuminates several issues that were 
raised throughout this essay. 
First, a focused description can be offered as 
an intentional explanation and, in a proper con­
text, accepted as such. The same is true for con­
ceptual accounts. Because of its unique level of 
questioning, a theoretical explanation can be ei­
ther "quantitative" or "qualitative," depending on 
what the questioner has in mind. As long as the 
appropriate "why" questions are raised, the selec­
tion of a fitting research design'remains primarily 
a technical problem. 
This means that on the theoretical level; far­
reaching choices must be made. Such decisions 
are not merely rational but also reflect practical 
and normative issues. As the well-known anthro­
pologist, Clifford Geertz (1983), put it: 
The strict separation of theory and data . , . the 
effort to create a formal vocabulary of analysis 
purged of all subjective reference, the "ideal lan­
guage" idea; and the claim to moral neutrality .•. 
none of these can prosper when explanation 
comes to, be regarded as a matter of connecting 
action to its sense rather than behavior to its de­
terminant. The refiguration of social theory rep­
resents . . . the sea change in our notion not so 
much of what knowledge is but of what we want 
to know. (1983, p. 34) 
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The quest for theoretical refiguration implicit in 
the above is shared by a growing set of scholars 
in family studies (Gubrium & Holstein, 1993; 
Thomas & Wilcox, 1987). My view on the use­
fulness of explanatory vocabularies differs from 
that of Geertz but I do agree that explaining in our 
field also seems overly concerned with "what 
knowledge is" at the expense of "what we want to 
know." Most relevant, however, is the interdepen­
dence of these two standards. After all, what we 
want to know depends on how we decide what 
knowledge really is. But that decision, in tum, is 
likely to be influenced by what we, collectively 
and/or as individuals, consider worth knowing. 
Let me pursue this important point by means of a 
final example. 
Darwinian evolutionary theory rests on the 
idea that evolutionary change is blind and an out­
come of a continuing interplay between the forces 
of chance and necessity. The theory lacks the pre­
dictive power coveted by positivist scholars, but 
its explanations manage to place a range of seem­
ingly unconnected facts into understandable con­
figurations. It represents a qualitative or singulari­
ty-focused type of explanation, an approach that, 
parenthetically, is far from exclusively Darwini­
an. Poincare's earlier cited analysis situs also is 
qualitative. In contrast, Newto~'s equations show 
both the power and the limitations of determinis­
tic quantitative explanation. They explain the mo­
tion of the planets, the cycle of the tides, and the 
ways in which things fall. They are not of much 
help, however, in attempts to understand why 
gravity works the way it does, or with the expla­
nation of climate and the weather. 
How, then, will family scholars choose to 
imagine the realities of marriage and family liv­
ing? Will they imagine them as analogous to the 
trajectories of the stars or the everlasting pound­
ing of the tides? Or to the' weather or the flow of a 
river on the way to its ultimate destination? These 
basic choices cannot be judged as true or false but 
rather as useful or useless. The relevance of the 
choice to those who decide is contextual and, as 
such, reflects the aspirations, knowledge, and his­
tory of those who raise the questions. For some of 
us the choice will be part of a search for God's 
truth, for others knowledge as a step towards lib­
eration, and, perhaps for a few, the outcome of an 
insatiable curiosity. To label any of such prefer­
ences as either wrong or correct would be, espe­
cially in a discipline like ours, unrealistic and 
counter-productive. 
NOTE 
This article is a thoroughly revised and expanded ver­
sion of a paper presented at tl)e Theory and Methodolo­
gy Workshop of the annual meeting of the National 
Council on Family Relations in Minneapolis, Minneso­
ta, November 1994. 
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